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Examining Potentiality in the Philosophy of Giorgio 
Agamben 
 
Elizabeth Balskus 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
“There is something that all people, whether they admit it or 
not, know in their heart of hearts: that things could have 
been different, that that would have been possible.  They 
could live not only without hunger and also probably 
without fear, but also freely.  And yet, at the same time—and 
all over the world—the social apparatus has become so 
hardened that what lies before them as a means of possible 
fulfillment presents itself as radically impossible” –Theodor 
Adorno 
 
 
 Following the publication of his book Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life in 1995,1 Giorgio Agamben 
quickly became one of the most widely discussed thinkers in 
contemporary European philosophy.  Although Agamben’s 
academic career has spanned over three decades, the success 
and relevance of the political critique found in Homo Sacer 
has led most analyses of Agamben to be centered around the 
significance of this book.  However, attempts to view 
Agamben’s philosophy through the lens of the political 
theory expounded in Homo Sacer seem vastly misguided.  
Agamben himself has proclaimed: “I could state the subject 
of my work as an attempt to understand the meaning of the  
                                                
1 Agamben, Giorgio.  1995.  Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare 
Life.  Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
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verb ‘can’ [potere].  What do I mean when I say: ‘I can, I 
cannot’?”2  Agamben later explains that this questioning of 
the verb potere leads him repeatedly to examine the 
categories of potentiality and actuality.  One can see 
throughout almost all of Agamben’s writings this theme of 
potentiality and a curiosity into the role potentiality plays in 
all aspects of our existence.  Indeed, one of the most central 
and obscure chapters in Homo Sacer, “Potentiality and 
Law,” focuses on the role potentiality plays in the power 
structures of our systems of sovereignty.  It would seem, 
therefore, that before we can begin to truly understand 
Agamben’s political or moral philosophy we should first 
attempt to grasp this potentiality that lies at the foundation of 
Agamben’s thought.         
 Attempting to define potentiality within Agamben’s 
philosophy, however, is an exceptionally difficult task.  
Leland de la Durantaye writes: “The first challenge to 
understanding Agamben’s idea of potentiality stems from its 
centrality”.3  Because the term potentiality is used in so 
much of Agamben’s work in various different ways, it is 
often easier to pinpoint its influence in a particular work, 
rather than elaborate what precisely this potentiality is.  
While de la Durantaye has argued (in my opinion, correctly) 
that potentiality plays a large role in all of the major ideas 
found in Agamben’s philosophy4, I believe that there are 
three concepts within Agamben’s thought that can lead to a 
richer, more precise idea of this potentiality: 
inoperativeness, decreation, and profanity.  In this paper, I  
                                                
2 Agamben, Giorgio.  1999.  Potentialities: Collected Essays in 
Philosophy.  Stanford: Stanford University Press, 177. 
3 De la Durantaye, Leland.  2009. Giorgio Agamben: A Critical 
Introduction. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 4. 
4 Ibid. 
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plan to examine Agamben’s potentiality, beginning with 
Agamben’s use of Aristotelian potentiality, through the role 
it plays in inoperativeness, decreation and profanity, 
showing that potentiality in Agamben’s philosophy goes far 
beyond the possibility to be or not be, but also serves as the 
foundation for political, creative and moral action.   
 
 
 
II.  Aristotle and Thought as Potentiality 
Between the idea 
And the reality 
Between the motion 
And the act 
Falls the shadow ‐ T.S. Eliot 
 
 
 No analysis of Giorgio Agamben’s potentiality can 
begin without a discussion of the potentiality found in 
Aristotle’s De Anima and Metaphysics.  Agamben begins 
almost every section of his writing on potentiality with 
Aristotle and consistently states that his own views on 
potentiality have their origins in Aristotle. Both Aristotle 
and Agamben maintain that anything potential is capable of 
not existing in actuality, and that “what is potential can both 
be and not be, for the same is potential both to be and not to 
be”.5    This statement initially seems to be a simple 
establishment of the contingency of beings and events.  
However, the relationship between the potential not to be  
                                                
5 Aristotle.  1986.  Metaphysics.  Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1050 b 10.  
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and reality can be seen in various ways.  Aristotle writes: “A 
thing is said to be potential if, when the act of which it is 
said to be potential is realized, there will be nothing 
impotential”.6  Agamben uses this definition of potentiality, 
which has often been interpreted as Aristotle merely stating 
that if something is not impossible then it can be called 
potential, as a foundation for a much deeper meaning of 
potentiality.  Agamben interprets Aristotle as saying, “if a 
potentiality to not-be originally belongs to all potentiality, 
then there is truly potentiality only where the potentiality to 
not-be does not lag behind actuality but passes fully into it 
as such”.7  Agamben finds within Aristotle a “potentiality 
that conserves itself and saves itself in actuality”.8  This 
concept of a potentiality that maintains itself even after an 
event is actualized is difficult to grasp.  What exactly can 
this potentiality consist of if an event has already occurred?  
The potential to not be is easiest understood in an 
example that both Aristotle and Agamben utilize: possessing 
a faculty.  Aristotle specifically writes about the faculty of 
sight as an ability that always contains within it its own 
potential to not be.  If we were constantly in a state of being 
where we could see, sight itself would not be a faculty which 
we possess; it would merely be a condition of our existence.  
However, we do not simply experience sight itself.  We also 
have the ability to experience darkness.  And it is because 
we can experience darkness and are aware of this sensation 
as the “not-being” of seeing that we can say that we possess 
the faculty of sight.  This potential of sight to not be 
maintains itself throughout our experiences, as we are  
                                                
6 Ibid., 1047 a 24-26. 
7 Potentialities, 183. 
8 Ibid., 184. 
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constantly aware of our potential for darkness and can 
achieve this darkness at any point (for example, by shutting 
our eyes).  At the very core of our ability to see is our 
potential for darkness, and it is indeed this potential for 
darkness that allows us to see the light.  De la Durantaye 
aptly states that Aristotle’s emphasis on the darker side of 
potentiality, the “not-to” that accompanies every ability we 
possess, is significant to Agamben’s concept of potentiality 
because, “it denotes the possibility for a thing not to pass 
into existence and thereby remain at the level of mere—or 
‘pure’—potentiality”.9  But what can this pure potentiality 
possibly entail? 
 The idea of a pure potentiality is made clearer in 
Agamben’s discussion of the intellect.  Aristotle states that 
nous, or the intellect, “has no other nature than that of being 
potential, and before thinking it is absolutely nothing”.10  
This statement leads Agamben to establish the intellect as 
the perfect example of pure potentiality, a potentiality 
“which in itself is nothing, [but] allows for the act of 
intelligence to take place”.11  But how are we to think of this 
potential of the intellect?  What does it mean to examine 
thought’s potential to not think?  Aristotle devotes a large 
section of the Metaphysics to addressing the complexity of 
the potentiality of the intellect.  The problem is fairly 
simple: Aristotle wishes to maintain that thought is the 
highest of all human faculties.  It becomes difficult to make 
this claim, however, if one simply views the intellect either 
as thinking about objects or not thinking at all.  De la  
                                                
9 Critical Introduction, 5. 
10 Aristotle.  1986.  De Anima. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 429 a 21-22. 
11 Potentialities, 245. 
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Durantaye explains: “If thought were merely the sum of 
things of which it has thought, not only would it be inferior 
to its object, but it would also leave unexplained thought’s 
most singular feature: its ability to reflect upon itself”.12  It is 
in thought’s ability to think itself that Aristotle is able to 
maintain the supremacy of the intellect: “thought thinks 
itself, if it is the most excellent of all things, and thought is 
the thinking of thinking”.13  It is in thinking itself, in 
detaching itself from any outside object, that the intellect is 
truly pure potentiality.   
Although Aristotle has provided Agamben with an 
example of pure potentiality, the relationship of this 
potentiality to actuality still remains ambiguous until 
Agamben explains in full the extreme significance of 
thought thinking itself. Agamben writes: “The potential 
intellect is not a thing.  It is nothing other than the intentio 
through which a thing is understood; it is not a known object 
but simply a pure knowability and receptivity.14  This “pure 
knowability and receptivity” of the intellect is, in fact, the 
pure potentiality of the intellect.  When viewed as the ability 
to know or reflect, pure potentiality of the intellect becomes 
extremely important.  This potentiality can exist apart from 
the actualization of any thought of a particular object 
because it is, in fact, this potentiality itself that allows for an 
object to even be thought.  Therefore, the potentiality of the 
intellect not only allows for thought to maintain a supreme 
position ontologically, it is also the foundation of thought in 
general.  Furthermore, “in the potentiality that thinks itself, 
action and passion coincide and the writing tablet writes by  
                                                
12 Critical Introduction, 5. 
13 Metaphysics, 1074 b 15-35. 
14 Potentialities, 251. 
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itself or, rather, writes its own passivity”.15  This idea of 
“action and passion coincid[ing]” and impotentiality giving 
itself up to a realized action is a theme frequented in 
Agamben’s writing.  For example, Agamben believes that 
perfect writing does not come from the desire to write any 
thing in particular, but “from an impotence that turns back 
on itself and in this way comes to itself as a pure act”.16   
This impotence that denies itself for the sake of 
actuality is quite abstract and difficult to understand.  
However, there are clear examples of the type of passion at 
play in Agamben’s philosophy, most notably, in his 
discussion of Glenn Gould in The Coming Community.  
Agamben writes: “even though every pianist necessarily has 
the potential to play and the potential to not-play, Glenn 
Gould is, however, the only one who can not not-play, and, 
directing his potentiality not only to the act but to his own 
impotence, he plays, so to speak, with his potential to not-
play”.17  This comment could refer to the notorious 
reputation Glenn Gould held as one of the most technically 
gifted pianists in the world, one of the most renowned 
performers of the 20th century, who did not, however, 
practice the piano regularly and, if he did practice, often did 
so without the use of an actual piano by miming the motions 
and playing the songs in his mind.  While every concert 
pianist has the skill to exercise his ability to play the piano, 
Glenn Gould, in exercising his ability to not play the piano 
by “playing” without his instrument, maintained his 
impotentiality as a pianist.  This impotentiality was turned  
                                                
15 Agamben, Giorgio.  1993.  The Coming Community.  Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 36. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 34. 
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back towards itself the minute Gould’s fingers touched a 
piano at a performance, when the skill and technique 
acquired by not playing the piano allowed Gould to play 
Bach better than any pianist in the world.  It is this act of 
impotentiality turning back on itself that is often lauded in 
Agamben’s writings as the highest action possible, and it is 
important to keep this concept of impotentiality giving itself 
to itself as the highest act in mind when examining 
Agamben’s views on ethics and politics.     
   
 
 
III.  The Inoperative 
“There is a time when the operation of the machine becomes 
so odious, makes you so sick at heart, that you can't take 
part” – Mario Savio 
 
 
 Leland de la Durantaye correctly states that, “no 
single term in Agamben’s writing is so easy to 
misunderstand as inoperativeness”.18  When Agamben 
writes in his book The Coming Community that 
inoperativeness should be “the paradigm for the coming 
politics”19, the reader’s initial reaction is most likely 
confusion.  While in English, the word inoperative has 
negative connotations of being useless or non-functional, the 
way in which Agamben uses the term is anything but 
negative.  Agamben is led to the topic of inoperativeness 
through examining the question of the purpose of mankind.  
Agreeing with many contemporary philosophers that, “there  
                                                
18 Critical Introduction, 18. 
19 Coming Community, 93. 
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is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no 
biological destiny that humans must enact or realize”20 
Agamben establishes in a section of The Coming Community 
entitled “Ethics” that, “there is in effect something that 
humans are and have to be…It is the simple fact of one’s 
own existence as possibility or potentiality”.21  For 
Agamben, therefore, the potential nature of human existence 
is the foundation of all moral and political actions.22  But 
how can human potentiality translate into moral activity?  
And how is this potentiality related to inoperativeness?  The 
potentiality to act and its relation to the inoperative becomes 
clear when examining two examples Agamben frequents in 
his writings: Bartleby the scrivener, and the 1989 protests at 
Tiananmen Square.   
 Herman Melville’s short story “Bartleby the 
Scrivener” details the life of Bartleby,23 a scrivener who 
decides to stop writing without any expressed reason other 
than his constant refrain: “I prefer not to.”  While Bartleby’s 
decision to cease writing (and performing most tasks of 
everyday life) eventually leads to his incarceration and 
death, Agamben points to Bartleby as a hopeful figure of 
pure potentiality, who “exceeds will (his own and that of  
                                                
20 Coming Community, 43. 
21 Ibid. 
22 It is important to note: “That ethics and politics should not be treated 
as separate and distinct disciplines is one of the guiding ideas in 
Agamben’s philosophy” (CI 13).  Therefore, in this paper I will often use 
the terms ethical and political interchangeably due to the belief I share 
with Agamben that the ideal political theory is simply people living 
together ethically.   
  
23 Melville, Herman.  2004.  Great Short Works of Herman Melville.  
New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics. 
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others) at every point” and is truly able “neither to posit nor 
to negate”.24  When asked to write, Bartleby, although he is 
fully capable of writing, simply replies that he would prefer 
not to.  By becoming a scrivener who does not write, 
Bartleby preserves his potentiality in its purest form.  
Bartleby’s stance also directly relates to the inoperative 
because Bartleby, in neither affirming nor negating the 
requests of his employer when he asks Bartleby to write, has 
effectively removed himself from the power structures at 
play.  At a very basic understanding, for Agamben, “to be 
‘inoperative’, it would seem, would be to refuse to be an 
operative part of the state’s machinery”.25  However, the 
example of Bartleby shows a more dynamic view of the 
inoperative that reaches beyond political action. 
“Inoperativeness… represents something not exhausted but 
inexhaustible—because it does not pass from the possible to 
the actual”.26  The reason that Bartleby is so disturbing to his 
employer (who is the narrator of the short story) is that, in 
removing himself from the constraints of reason and, indeed, 
the constraints of society as a whole, he is the paradigm of 
the inoperative, of “the other side of potentiality: the 
possibility that a thing might not come to pass”.27  And 
because Bartleby never offers a reason for his refusal to 
work and never actually denies the requests made of him, 
the authorities at hand are completely bewildered as to how 
to deal with the scrivener.   
 Bartleby is not the only example of a figure of the 
inoperative utilized by Agamben.  Agamben often cites the  
                                                
24 Potentialities, 255, 257. 
25 Critical Introduction, 18. 
26 Ibid., 19. 
27 Ibid. 
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demonstrations at Tiananmen Square as an example of 
political activism similar to that he envisions for the coming 
politics.  Agamben notes: “What was most striking about the 
demonstrations of the Chinese May was the relative absence 
of determinate contents in their demands”.28  The 
demonstrators at Tiananmen Square presented themselves as 
“something that could not and did not want to be 
represented, but that presented itself nonetheless as a 
community and as a common life”.29  It is this coming 
together of people without any presupposition of belonging 
to a group united by a common identity that the Chinese 
government found so dangerous.  If the protestors had 
demanded any particular goals, the government could have 
found a way to defend itself and deny them, but the group of 
protestors at Tiananmen Square were simply removing 
themselves from the “machinery” of the Chinese 
government, declaring themselves inoperative until their 
situation could become bearable.  Successful political action 
in the future, therefore, would be to embrace one’s 
potentiality and declare oneself as inoperative within the 
sovereign structures of one’s society.           
 
IV.  Decreation 
“Don’t play what’s there, play what’s not there.” – Miles 
Davis 
 
  Potentiality in any context can easily be seen as a 
creative force.  In the individual’s ability to act or not act, 
create or destroy, there is a level of creative potential within  
                                                
28 Agamben, Giorgio.  2000.  Means Without End: Notes on Politics.  
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 88. 
29 Ibid. 
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every person.  “For [Agamben],” de la Durantaye points out, 
“potentiality is indeed to be understood in the context of 
creation, but seen from a strange side—one that he calls 
decreation”.30  The word decreation is not a term commonly 
used and therefore requires closer examination.  Agamben 
once defined decreation as a “threshold between doing and 
not-doing”, a limit that is reached in the creative process 
where the artist “no longer creates but decreates”.31  De la 
Durantaye is quick to assert that this ambiguous notion of 
decreation should be viewed neither as an “undoing of 
creation” or a “deconstruction”.32  How, then, are we to 
conceive of this strange idea of decreation?   
 A greater understanding of decreation can be found 
in a section of Agamben’s essay, “Bartleby, or On 
Contingency” called “The Experiment, or On Decreation.”  
Agamben begins by recounting Leibniz’s conception of 
contingency and potentiality.  Leibniz states in his essay, On 
Freedom, that he was “brought back from this precipice [of 
fatalism] by a consideration of those possibles which neither 
do exist, nor will exist, nor have existed”.33  When Leibniz 
considered the problem of free will and moral responsibility, 
he originally came to the conclusion that, if God created 
everything and had foreknowledge of all that he created, 
then everything that has existed, exists and will exist must 
exist necessarily.  If every action I perform must necessarily 
occur, then none of my actions could have been otherwise.  
And if it was completely impossible for me to have done 
otherwise, blaming me for my actions by sending me to Hell  
                                                
30 Critical Introduction, 22. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 On Freedom, 106. 
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for eternity seems, at the very least, unjust.  At the very 
moment the entire universe seemed devoid of any 
contingency, Leibniz remembered that there are literally an 
infinite number of events that could occur or actions that 
could be taken in a person’s life that are never realized in 
actuality but nevertheless exist as possibilities.  This 
consideration led Leibniz to the realization that everything 
that exists in the actual universe (with the exception of the 
laws logic and geometry) could have been otherwise.  And it 
is due to this realization that Leibniz conceived of the 
principle of sufficient reason, which states that everything 
that occurs happens for a reason.  From the principle of 
sufficient reason, Leibniz comes to the conclusion that the 
universe in which we live is the best possible universe, 
because God, containing perfect reason, had to have created 
this universe because it was better than all of the other 
possible alternatives.  Leibniz’s conception of the 
contingency of the universe is best articulated in the final 
pages of Leibniz’s Theodicy, which he describes a chamber 
containing all of the possible worlds that could have existed 
instead of the actual world. The potential worlds exist in 
what Leibniz describes as “an order succession of worlds, 
which shall contain each and every one the case that is in 
question, and shall vary its circumstances and its 
consequences”34 which God sometimes examines, admiring 
his decision to create the world as it is.  These potential 
worlds will never be actualized, but the principle of 
sufficient reason necessitates the eternal existence of these 
potentialities in God’s understanding.  The worlds continue 
to exist in God’s understanding, because if they were to  
 
                                                
34 Theodicy, 371. 
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disappear, there would be nothing to compare the actual 
world to—it would simply exist. 
 These necessarily existing possible worlds are the 
reason why Agamben draws upon Leibniz when discussing 
pure potentiality and the idea of decreation.  In fact, one can 
easily see in the figure of Leibniz’s God the same 
potentiality of Bartleby the scrivener—this ability to 
maintain the potential for an event to happen and not happen 
at the same time.  Leibniz’s God can look at the world as it 
is in actuality and also the potential for other worlds, thereby 
forever maintaining the contingency of the universe, as, for 
God, everything could eternally happen or not happen.  This 
is the reason that God returns to the “ordered succession of 
worlds”—in his ability to view all of the possible worlds, he 
is also, in a way, negating the actual act of creation.  All 
possibilities still exist within his understanding, and will 
continue to exist for all eternity.    
 However, Agamben does find fault with Leibniz’s 
conception of contingency and God asserting his freedom in 
revisiting the moment prior to creation, because in returning 
to the moment of decision, before the actual became 
actualized, God has to “close his own ears to the incessant 
lamentation…from everything that could have been 
otherwise but had to be sacrificed for the present world to be 
as it is”. 35 It is at this point when Agamben’s take on 
potentiality differs from that of Leibniz, and this is where 
Bartleby again becomes useful in our understanding of 
Agamben. In never explaining himself or actually stating 
“yes” or “no” to any of his employer’s demands, Bartleby 
“calls into question this…supremacy of the will over  
 
                                                
35 Ibid. 
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potentiality”.36  And as the will, for Leibniz, is necessarily 
determined by reason, Bartleby also calls into question the 
supremacy of reason and asserts his potentiality as a man 
without will or reason for his actions.  Through his phrase “I 
would prefer not to,” Bartleby challenges the principle of 
sufficient reason. If the laws of reason do not apply, then 
there is no legitimate justification for why this world exists 
and the infinite number of potential worlds were never 
actualized. This is why Agamben refers to Bartleby as a 
messiah who has arrived to “save what was not”.37  Because 
the laws of reason do not apply to him, Bartleby asserts the 
right of those possibilities that have never and will never 
exist to be actualized. 
 The value of Bartleby as a messiah for all of the 
possibilities that are never actualized can easily be called 
into question.  If God, as Leibniz argues, creates this world 
because it is the best, then what is the use of invoking these 
potential events that were not chosen because they were 
inferior?  It is this inferiority of the possible worlds that 
Agamben wishes to challenge.  While Leibniz can argue that 
God must have rationally chosen the best of all possible 
worlds, Agamben is clearly using Bartleby to call into 
question the supremacy of rationality as a justification for 
creation.  Bartleby asserts that, while this world may be the 
most rational, that does not necessarily make it the best.  
Rationality, which for so long has been almost synonymous 
with morality within the Western philosophical tradition, 
particularly in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, may, in 
fact, be as arbitrary of a gauge for the merit of an action as 
anything else.  By championing the cause of events that have  
                                                
36 Potentialities, 254. 
37 Ibid., 270. 
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never and will never exist, Bartleby calls into question on a 
fundamental level why things exist as they do, why the 
world was not and is not otherwise.          
 Within the framework of Leibniz’s cosmology, 
Agamben defines decreation as, “a second creation in which 
God summons all his potential not to be, creating on the 
basis of a point of indifference between potentiality and 
impotentiality”.38  In examining this decreation, therefore, 
we can see that “potentiality truly understood is not only all 
that came to pass but also all that might have come to pass 
and did not”.39  In every person’s life, there is at least one 
moment when she asks the simple question: why?  Why did 
I go to Macalester College instead of University of Chicago?  
Why am I studying philosophy and not music?  A large 
amount of our thoughts and energy are devoted to 
considerations of options we did not choose and actions we 
did not take.  We often find ourselves wondering how we 
ended up in a particular situation and what would have 
happened if we had chosen a different path.  Once our 
decisions have been made, however, we tend to look at the 
events leading up to them as necessary: I had to go to 
Macalester because University of Chicago wanted me to 
borrow too much money in student loans; I had to study 
philosophy because I found that studying music made 
performing and listening to music less pleasurable.  I have to 
currently be a student because if I do not get a college 
degree, my odds of finding a fulfilling career are slim.  This 
after-the-fact necessity we apply to events is what Agamben 
takes such umbrage with.  What we all know and yet 
constantly try to deny is that we could have acted differently  
                                                
38 Ibid. 
39 Critical Introduction, 23. 
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and the current situation does not have to be as it is now.  In 
decreation, contingency is returned to all events, causing us 
to remember that, along with the few potentialities that are 
actualized, there are an infinite number of potentialities that 
will never be and, yet, will continue to shape and influence 
our lives. 
 
 
V.  Profanity 
“In certain trying circumstances, urgent circumstances, 
desperate circumstances, profanity furnishes a relief denied 
even to prayer” – Mark Twain 
 
 
  In his book Profanations, Agamben attributes 
Trebatius with the quote: “In the strict sense, profane is the 
term for something that was once sacred or religious and is 
returned to the use and property of men”.40  In looking at the 
distinction between the profane, which can be utilized by 
everyone, and the sacred, which traditionally belongs to the 
sphere of the divine and cannot be touched by humanity, 
Agamben sees great potential for appropriation of the sacred 
into the profane.  One way of reclaiming the sacred for the 
profane that Agamben believes has been severely neglected 
in contemporary life is the act of playing.  “Play not only 
derives from the sphere of the sacred but also in some ways 
represents its overturning”.41  In taking the rituals involved 
with the sacred and using them for playful purposes, 
“play…drops the myth and preserves the rite”.42  By  
                                                
40 Agamben, Giorgio.  2007. Profanations.  Boston: Zone Books, 73. 
41 Ibid., 75. 
42 Ibid. 
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maintaining the structures of power but imbuing them with 
new meaning, such as the use of religious rituals in the 
children’s song and dance “Ring around the Rosy”, the act 
of play is a powerful tool.  In fact, Agamben states that, “to 
return to play its purely profane vocation is a political 
task”.43  
 This discussion of profanity and sacredness may 
initially seem out of place when discussing modern politics.  
Though the categories of the sacred and the profane may at 
first seem outdated, Agamben clarifies that, although we 
may no longer refer to it as the sacred, there is a “religious 
sphere that assails every thing, every place, every human 
activity in order to divide it from itself”.1  This sphere is the 
sphere of consumption.  The sacred realm of capitalism is, 
according to Agamben, consumption, and capitalism in its 
most pure, extreme form is concerned with making 
experience unusable or unprofanable by separating our 
actions from ourselves and presenting them back to us as a 
spectacle, to be observed and not used.  A good example of 
this attempt to alienate ourselves from ourselves is 
pornography: the human form is appropriated, filmed, and 
then presented to us as something that can be watched but 
never experienced.  Agamben calls this phenomenon 
“museification.”  “Everything today can become a Museum, 
because this term simply designates the exhibition of an 
impossibility of using, of dwelling, of experiencing”.2  It is 
of extreme importance, therefore, that future politics “wrest 
from the apparatuses [of power]—from all apparatuses—the 
possibility of use that they have captured”.3  The reclaiming  
                                                
43 Ibid., 77. 
1 Ibid., 81. 
2 Ibid., 84. 
3 Ibid., 92. 
  176 
 
of the possibility of use is, in fact, “the political task of the 
coming generation”.4 
 We can see, therefore, that potentiality lies at the 
very heart of this concept of the profane.  In examining the 
current structures of power and the rituals of our time, we 
have the ability to find within them the possibility for new 
use.  Agamben uses the example of feces to illustrate this 
point.  While, in everyday society, feces are clearly off 
limits and have only one purpose (that is, to be expelled and 
then removed) Agamben notes that babies, almost 
instinctually, like to play with feces, to explore their 
different uses, until society intervenes and they are 
conditioned not to.  While Agamben does not advocate the 
widespread movement to promote creative use of feces, his 
point in invoking such an extreme example is clear: there is 
the possibility for new use of the objects that surround us.  
We simply have to recognize these objects’ potential for a 
different purpose than the one they have traditionally held.  
This potential for new use is the only way to combat 
capitalism’s attempt to make experience unusable. To return 
to the example of pornography, Agamben notes that while 
pornography has alienated our own bodily form and 
sexuality from ourselves, there is potential to negate this 
effect by engaging with the figures at hand.  He cites the 
example of a pornographic star who, instead of simulating 
the pleasure associated with the sexual acts in which she is 
engaged, simply looks, as though bored, at the camera and, 
in a sense, watches the viewer watching her.5 In this act of 
looking at the camera, the fantasy world of the pornographic 
is shattered; you are no longer watching a torrid affair, but  
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rather, are distinctly aware of the unreality of the situation 
being enacted on screen.  While this development in 
pornography has not yet been explored in its fullest capacity, 
Agamben believes that the potential is there to reclaim the 
body’s sexuality and reengage with our own experience.  
And indeed, this potential for profanity extends far beyond 
the realm of pornography.  We must simply be willing to 
look at our world through the eyes of an infant and allow 
ourselves to glimpse the possibility for new use in 
everything around us.      
   
 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
“The absolute desperate state of affairs in the society in 
which I live fills me with hope”  
                                                 - Giorgio Agamben             
 
 
In a chapter of his book The Coming Community 
entitled “The Irreparable” Giorgio Agamben describes the 
world after the final, biblical Judgment Day as, “just as it is, 
irreparably, but precisely this will be its novelty”.6  
Consistent throughout Agamben’s political writings is the 
idea that today’s society, in all of its injustice and atrocity, 
contains within it the means to transform itself into a more 
just, desirable world.  This idea that from the depths of 
despair we can grab the tools to transform ourselves is not 
novel to Agamben—Marx’s quote from The Communist 
Manifesto, “The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled  
                                                
6 Coming Community, 39. 
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feudalism to the ground are now turned against the 
bourgeoisie itself” expresses the same sentiment.  This 
theme is repeated again in The Coming Community’s 
chapter, “Halos”, in which Agamben characterizes life after 
the coming of the messiah, saying, “everything will be as it 
is now, just a little different”.7  This slight difference, the 
“halo…added to perfection”8 is “a zone in which possibility 
and reality, potentiality and actuality, become 
indistinguishable”.9 
This halo, this recognition of the contingency of our 
situation, is more attainable than it would at first appear.  As 
Agamben has pointed out, we already possess the means; the 
key is potentiality.  Going far beyond the classical definition 
of potentiality as the ability of something to be or not be, 
potentiality becomes, for Agamben, the most significant 
truth of our existence and the only basis for a coming 
politics not rife with destruction.  We can see in Agamben’s 
conception of the inoperative the call to, like Bartleby, 
embrace our impotentiality and, instead of demanding 
specific changes, declare that we will not participate in the 
modes of sovereignty at play in today’s society.  We see in 
the concept of decreation the want to restore to all events 
their initial contingency or potentiality, to realize that things 
did not have to and do not have to be the way they are.  To, 
according to a quote from Benjamin that Agamben himself 
employs, restore “possibility to the past, making what 
happened incomplete and completing what never was”.10  
And we see in the profane the need to grasp what is already 
at hand and play with it.   
                                                
7 Ibid., 53. 
8 Ibid., 54. 
9 Ibid., 55. 
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This hope for change in the face of darkness explains 
why Agamben, despite the fact that his analysis of the 
current political situation is dire (some have even said 
apocalyptic), is often surprised when he is characterized as 
being pessimistic.  Yes, we live in an era with the extreme 
potential for catastrophe. But, indeed, this potential for 
despair is always also the potential for hope—this is the 
beauty of potentiality.  What Agamben hopes to accomplish 
with the potentialization of society is the reexamination of 
what we believe is truly possible and impossible.  In viewing 
the world and its events as truly contingent, it becomes clear 
that we cannot and should not wait for the messiah, some 
future event that will liberate us, or a divine revelation, 
because, after all, “the life that begins on earth after the last 
day is simply human life”.11        
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